Edward Fullbrook, intro, Intersubjective Economics,

 intro to Intersubjective Economics

This intro chapter sketches how neoclassical economics is rooted in the idea of methodological individualism, although Fullbrook never uses that term. 

Just by the way, this guy Fullbrook writes or participates in some really cool looking books, like edited collections called pluralist economics and what's wrong with economics. You'll def have to read a lot of these. 

The intro compares or rather contrasts intrasubjective economics, which is seen as compatible with neoclassical economics, and intersubjective economics, which is not.  I'm guessing that the intra- is because it assumes the boundedness of individuals. Between subjects. 

Oh that's interesting. Between subjects versus within subjects. Like with Davida. 

I did have a few questions after reading this. 

• why does intersubjectivity explode the idea of supply and demand?
• why was the idea of intrasubjectivity considered OK? that is, when people were living at subsistence levels?

First one. Supply and demand. I think that one can be answered by the one example with the TV. 

The conversation value of a television program approaches nil for the viewer when no one else watches it. In the television industry everyone knows that a prime reason for choosing to regularly watch a particular program is that other people, especially people one knows, are watching it. This hypothesis, that an agent’s demand for a product may depend positively on the number of other people demanding it, though uncon- tested throughout the media industries, remains out of bounds for neo- classical, that is, intrasubjective theory. In Chapter 8 Hargreaves Heap, beginning with the case of television, argues that this variety of demand interdependence operates also in non-media industries, but that because the origin of the interdependence may be different in those industries, it is for them not necessarily a common cause of market failure. Hargreaves Heap, therefore, seeks to develop an understanding of the various ways in which demand is intersubjectively constituted. 

Again it comes down to boundedness. Methodological individualism, if I'm using that term right, means that my desires have to be my own, that I'm capable of rationally making decisions for myself, that I'm not leaky, so to speak. 

Or there was the conspicuous consumerism idea too. I'm leaky, and you can tell because I want to buy this flashy car, not necessarily because I want the car, but because I want to be seen by others as the kind of person who drives this car. The demand for the car then stems from its ability? to be used as? bolstering the power of others, for increasing? the power that individuals' have????? 

Different approach. The hidden hand of the market, a phrase not used in this intro, means that supply and demand balance themselves. Or no maybe that has to do with price too. 

Equilibrium was used in this intro, but I don't really understand the theory--that is, general equilibrium theory. Equilibrium. Balance.   

Demand also. Gunn. 

Consumption. Marx. Baudrillard. Consumption got used a lot, and Fullbrook also mentioned how neoclassical economics didn't take into consideration consumption. 

Oh structure and agency. 

Ideally, the concept development required for this undertaking falls into two categories. First, concepts of non-atomistic agents must be formed, concepts subtle enough to capture the ambiguity and complexity of the intersubjective agent. Second, social, cultural and economic struc- tures created by such agents must be identified and analyzed in terms of the way they in turn shape and reshape the agents. Hence, the division of this collection’s chapters into two parts: agents and structures. But of course intersubjectivity means that agents and agents, and agents and socio-economic structures are interdependent, so that conceptualizing one level inevitably involves concepts relating to the other. In all the chap- ters, therefore, you will find considerations of both kinds of concepts. 

Here is the quote from which my first question emanates:

In terms of economic model building, the difference between intra and intersubjective relations is fundamental. Neoclassical economics’ two basic functional concepts, supply and demand, are predicated on the assump- tion that no intersubjective relations enter into the determination of market supply and demand. They are conceived as simple additive aggregations of the supplies and demands of the individual subjects. These conceptions preclude any intersubjective relations between economic agents influenc- ing the determination of their supplies and demands, because such inter- dependencies would void the definition of market demand and supply. This formalistic imperative has meant that, for more than a century, inter- subjectivity has been taboo in mainstream economics. 

There was the math part too, the one person in this collection who was like (will be like?) the reason neoclassical economists went with the intrasubjective model is that they wanted to use math. But now with increased computing power, we can use math to model intersubjective economics. 

Second question. Why was intrasubjective economics OK when we? were living at subsistence levels?

There was also that person mentioned in this, the person who was talking about how social constructionism only really applies to ... higher level or... let's just find it. 

In Chapter 3 Anne Mayhew challenges a foundational idea, not just of neoclassical economics, but also of the classical and Marxian traditions. She argues that an agent’s subsistence needs, beyond basic nutritional and shelter requirements, are socially constructed. In all societies, she writes, “what is ‘surplus’ and what is needed for survival is defined socially.” Neoclassical theorists, she argues, have had to deny, ignore or play down the social determination of consumption patterns and the significance of advertising in order to continue with their definition of the rational con- sumer. Mayhew notes that economists are the only social scientists who treat the social role of consumption as trivial. She then takes apart the two arguments that mainstream economists have used to justify their eccentric position. 

Also you forgot, there was the Diane Davis cheating part:

In Chapter 2 Ernst Fehr and Armin Falk arrive at conclusions similar to those of Davis, but by radically different means. Fehr and Falk belong to the small but growing number of experimental economists. In their Zurich laboratories they attempt to unravel the enigmas of economic agency. One such is that, despite the ubiquity of material incentives for cheating, most economic actors most of the time do not cheat other actors. Some of these choices to forgo rewards are explainable by game theory models of repeated interaction. But most are not. For these Fehr and Falk hypothesize that, given favorable social conditions, there exists a procliv- ity for agents to be willing to sacrifice resources to be kind to those who are being kind and to punish those who are being unkind. They call their hypothesis, which is confirmed in laboratory experiments, reciprocal fair- ness. Fehr and Falk review the empirical evidence. They also explore the relationship between reciprocal fairness and socio-economic cooperation and explain how social structures aimed at deterring cheating may have the opposite effect, so much so as to induce the majority of people to cheat. 

Yes on that last part "social structures aimed at deterring cheating may have the opposite effect, so much so as to induce the majority of people to cheat"--modes of writing assessment bear this out. 

You had no idea what this was. 

Geoffrey Hodgson’s ambitious essay, which comprises Chapter 10, develops the concept of “reconstitutive downward causation” in the con- text of individual agency. It, in fact, addresses the agency–structure problem head on. Reconstitutive downward causation involves the proposition that individuals are formed as well as constrained by their sit- uation. Hodgson briefly discusses the genealogy and basis of this idea, and argues that this concept or one very like it is necessary if social sci- ence is to avoid inconsistent or incomplete arguments. He also contrasts reconstitutive downward causation with other approaches found in the social sciences. 

It's probably just rhetoric--like they're trying to theorize rhetoric without rhetoric as a field. 

You've strayed from the second question. Does it have to do with care? like, if I'm hungry, then I don't care about or can't attend to what others are attending to?

Scarcity is important in economics. When resources are NOT scarce, shit gets weird. Where was the surplus quote? "all societies, she writes, “what is ‘surplus’ and what is needed for survival is defined socially"--but doesn't the last part contradict what she said earlier? "what is needed for survival is defined socially"--you're thinking about the phone argument. A phone is necessary for survival. No it's not. Etc. I just feel like this sentence "She argues that an agent’s subsistence needs, beyond basic nutritional and shelter requirements, are socially constructed" is at odds with this one "what is needed for survival is defined socially"

Here's the quote that you're getting the second question from:

From the vantage point of a high-tech, instantaneous mass communica- tion consumer society, the notion that economic agents are autonomous subjectivities and that, therefore, economic phenomena are exclusively intrasubjective appears as a palpable absurdity. In our age we all know that what we think, desire and decide as economic actors depends a great deal on what other actors are seen to think, desire and decide. But this was not always so much the case. When neoclassical economics was in its forma- tive stages (1870–1890), economic activity was primarily about satisfying material needs in a pre-electronic world. Prior to the last century, most people in the West lived at or near subsistence level. Inter-subjectivity does not enter directly into the determination of the biological requirements of sustaining a human life and of providing it with basic physical comfort. So at the time of economics’ founding and through much of the nineteenth century, basing the concept of homo economicus on atomistic individualism and sensationalist psychology, although limiting the scope of its inquiry, left it with a wide field to cover. In other words, it was an age when intra- subjective economics could arguably claim as its domain the greater part of economic phenomena. But in our age, outside of the poorest countries, the economic realm to which intrasubjective economics pertains grows smaller and smaller every year. 

I feel like this is at odds with Wynter, who would argue that "Inter-subjectivity does not enter directly into the determination of the biological requirements of sustaining a human life and of providing it with basic physical comfort" is wrong? or maybe at odds with how

Sylvia Wynter argues that humans are a “hybrid-auto-instituting-languaging-storytelling species” & that we are a product or our origin stories. What else should be a praxis instead of a noun? This question has been an amazing frame for my work on multimodality.

— Dan Martin (@danmartin_7) July 6, 2021

Back to question two. Fullbrook does use the phrase pre-electronic. This is probably a methodological split, like in rhetoric we would use the phrase always already, like even the ancients were digital. But I don't think Fullbrook is doing that. But I def see how digital technology exacerbates what's already there, kind of like the Carolyn Miller claim that the blog doesn't so much invent? a relation? but amplify one that's already there. Networks as amplifiers. Like with the TV example earlier. Conspicuous consumption. All of this turns on excess. Surplus (what what counts as surplus, of course). But I can definitely see a direct relationship with excess and intersubjectivity. The more excess, the more? intersubjectivity. The logic of more has to be shit though (cf. Boyle and Rivers). But we're bumping up against field values. Like Bataille would argue that there was excess pre-digitally (via the sacred?), but I think I still get Fullbrook's point nonetheless, that neoclassical economics could get away with the intrasubjective model when most of what most people were buying was linked to subsistence necessity--food, clothing, maybe a book here and there, the bible, rent, etc. I get it.