Pragmatic regimes governing the engagement with the world

In Laurent Thevenot's chapter, he makes a case for his three regimes of engagement, which are meant to contrast with the notion of practice as over-extended and overly applied (kind of like the lab in Latour). I don't know if this applies to Bourdieu exactly, but the problem has to do with sharing. This is for sure a problem with social constructionism. In that framework, it is argued that people act on the basis of shared conventions; people have these beliefs, habits, customers, etc., and it is this sharing (the sharing of these tacit conventions) that allows people to coordinate their actions. I'm not positive that coordination is at stake exactly but it sounds good. In any case, Thevenot argues that action doesn't spring from shared, tacit conventions, but rather shared modes of engagement. To be clear on this point, we don't share a practice; we share a cognitive format. No...is that too Habermas? It's not a practice per se, is it? Thevenot says at one point that it's grounded in the relations between (people?) and things ("My research first examined the agents’ capacities to move from particularized situations to general forms according to operations of ‘investment of form’ (Thévenot 1984) which are grounded in a relation to things and their transformation."). It seems cognitive--like a distributed cognition, since objects are involved. Anyways, we share what Thevenot calls modes of engagement, the outlines of which seem to be universal: do other cultures share the three modes of engagement? The three modes (or cités?) are

• familiarly 
• planned action
• justification 

I'm guessing this is a flattening of the hierarchy in CHAT, the three levels. Thevenot doesn't use the word test I don't think, but ... yea let's not. He does talk about switching though ("We wanted to address an important issue which could not be dealt with by Bourdieu’s framework: the capacity demanded by contemporary societies to shift from one pragmatic orientation to another, depending on arrangements specific to the situation."). Thevenot gives the example of lighting a stove. In your own home, maybe you have to develop a technique in order to light it. For us at 2706 Cole street, it would have been the refrigerator door (la perruque?). If someone is going to stay at your house, you have to give them instructions for how to work it. You have to stop using your chair as a place to hang laundry. Interestingly, Thevenot anticipates the move to propriety here:

This is a complicated thing I don't really stand but he says at one point that there's a link between evaluation and objectivity. Oh it was literally the next sentence ("This connection between realism and evaluation requires a significant move from the clear-cut classical fact/value distinction"). But to get back to the example, it's sufficient (according to what?) to give your friend instructions to hold the match a certain way in order to light the stove, but that wouldn't hold up in court. There, the stove would be disqualified in the technical sense insofar as it would need to stand up to tests of effectivity. If the friend got severely burned, it might be the stove company's fault, and parties would need to justify themselves using the OOW. So the good is different in each regime.

Notice the first row. 

Inform, Boyle C. Form. Being, Heidegger. Format. 

Quetelet, Building Access: Universal Design and the Politics of Disability, by Aimi Hamraie.

Durkheim, social fact, fact/value distinction. [Parson's pact, value and values.]

Two senses of engagement. 

Mauss, techniques du corps, Boyle C.

Mauss-Durkheim level. 

Personality 

Modeling

Environment

Realism

"The problem may be summarized as follows. The category of ‘social norm’ closely follows the definition of the social; but the social also supports objectivity; hence, the sociological avatar of the good happens to be very similar to sociological objectivity so that both categories are easily collapsed into the single core notion of ‘social.’"